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Abstract In this contribution, we investigate the extent to which the recent finan-
cial crisis has affected levels of political participation in general and more partic-
ularly within privileged and underprivileged societal groups in the Netherlands. We
derive competing and complementary theoretical propositions about the possible
effects of the economic downturn on conventional and unconventional modes of
political participation. Economic decline might mobilize people to voice their
concerns in the political arena, especially via unconventional modes of political
participation such as demonstrating. As privileged societal groups are more likely to
participate in politics, economic decline may widen the initial differences between
privileged and underprivileged societal groups in their level of political participa-
tion. We use the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies collected before
(2002–2006), at the onset of the Eurocrisis (2006–2010) and after prolonged periods
of recession (2008–2012) to empirically assess these competing claims. Our results
show a slight decrease in conventional modes of political participation and a slight
increase in unconventional modes of political participation during the recent
financial and economic crisis. We do not find that the relationship between the
economic crisis and political participation changes significantly differently for
privileged and underprivileged groups in the Netherlands.
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Introduction and research question
After the financial crisis hit Europe in 2008, various protest movements took the
stage in the media, and the political and societal realm. Europe (and beyond)
witnessed the uprising of a wide variety of protest movements, for instance protests
against austerity measures in Greece, the ‘15 M—movement’ in Spain and the
global ‘occupy movement’. These protests are indications that hard economic times
might induce people to participate in (protest) politics (Mun˜oz et al. 2013; Ponticelli
and Voth 2011).
Beyond the quintessential literature on economic voting, it dealt with the
question whether economic conditions influence party choice and turnout (Anderson
2007; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier 2000; Radcliff 1992); surprisingly, little attention
has been paid to the link between macro-economic conditions and modes of
political involvement other than voting such as demonstrating and petitioning. In
this contribution, we transpose propositions that stem from the economic voting
literature and analyse modes of political participation: political actions conducted
within a five-year period.
The Netherlands, a country with traditionally high levels of political and
community participation (Gesthuizen et al. 2013; Linssen and Schmeets 2010)
makes an interesting case in this respect. The once stable and pillarized Dutch
political landscape is characterized by increased political polarization (Aarts et al.
2007) in more recent times. The Netherlands saw no less than 5 general elections
between 2002 and 2012. The three most recent Dutch Parliamentary Elections were
held in 2006, 2010, and 2012 and coincided with the rise of the global financial and
economic crisis. In 2006, the election came before the global financial crisis. In
2010, the parliamentary elections coincided with the onset of the Eurocrisis and the
global economic crisis. Finally, in 2012 after prolonged periods of recession in the
Netherlands, the administration lead by Mark Rutte collapsed while negotiating on
harsh austerity measures in response to the economic decline. The timing of these
elections and thereby the timing of the election studies, provides a unique ‘natural
experiment’ to explore the effect of economic downturn on levels of political
participation, both for privileged and deprived strata in society.
We attempt to explore the link between macro-economic conditions in recent
years in the Netherlands and levels of political participation. Did the recent financial
and economic crises induce political participation or did citizens refrain from
participating in politics during economic hardship? We set out to assess competing
and complementary theoretical propositions concerning the effect of economic
conditions on political participation in the Netherlands. Using the Dutch
Parliamentary Election Studies, we aim to assess to what extent economic
conditions affected individual-level political participation in the 2002–2012 period
among the general population as well as among subpopulations with higher and
lower resources. Therefore, our research question reads: To what extent are levels of
political participation affected in general, and among privileged and underprivileged
societal groups during times of economic downturn in the Netherlands between
2002 and 2012?
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Theory and hypotheses
Political participation
Political participation is broadly defined as those activities aimed at influencing the
political decision-making process. To take into account a wide range of political
actions, we use conventional and unconventional modes of political participation.
Conventional political participation refers to all modes of participation directly
embedded in legal institutional frameworks, or directly referring to the electoral
process and representational system, such as voting, contacting politicians or
attending hearings (Barnes and Kaase 1979). Unconventional political participation
includes all modes of political participation not formally linked to the electoral
process such as petitioning, demonstrating, and boycotting products (Barnes and
Kaase 1979).1
Macro economic conditions
The Netherlands has witnessed economic decline on several domains in the period
2002–2012. In 2002, 4.1% of the Dutch labour force was unemployed, this rose to
6.4% of the labour force in 2012 (CBS 2014a). Prime Minister Balkenende’s fourth
cabinet that was elected in 2006 was confronted with the global credit crunch. In
response to the global financial crisis in 2008, the Dutch government had to support
the largest Dutch bank with capital injections and nationalize the second largest
bank in the Netherlands. During the last year of Balkenende’s fourth cabinet, the
global credit crunch started to affect the real economy and economic growth
plummeted, especially in the first (-4.0%) and second quarter of 2009 (-5.0%)
(CBS 2013). Moreover, the situation on the Dutch housing market deteriorated
between 2006 and 2012. The number of households whose mortgage exceeded the
appraised value of their house doubled between 2006 and 2012 (CBS 2014b).
Against the backdrop of the global financial crisis the national debt rose from 47.4%
of GDP in 2006 to 71.3% of GDP in 2012 (CBS 2014c). This was also reflected in
the most important national problems mentioned by the electorate. In 2006, only
12% of the Dutch electorate reported that the economic situation was the most
important national problem and this tripled in 2010 (to 38%) and rose even further
to 47% in 2012 (CBS 2014d). Moreover, especially the lower-educated and lower
social classes report about the deterioration of their own financial situation. In line
with the figures in 2010 (Hackert et al. 2012), no less than 80% of the working class
1 Unconventional political participation has been labelled differently throughout time. One might argue
that unconventional activities are increasingly accepted and regarded as ‘normal’ modes of (Dalton 2008;
Lamprianou 2013; Norris et al. 2005). Thus, some of the activities such as attending a demonstration lost
its ‘unconventional’ connotation. This renders the term ‘unconventional’ political participation somewhat
old-fashioned. However, other labels used such as ‘extra-institutional’ participation, ‘emerging forms of
political participation’, and ‘non-electoral participation’ still refer to the same political actions
empirically. Thus, although labelled differently, the acts referred to when describing ‘unconventional’,
‘non-institutionalized’ or ‘protest participation’ are identical since they still refer to non-legally
embedded political actions such as petitioning and demonstrating whereas conventional action still refer
to legally embedded modes such as attending hearings and writing to government officials.
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and of the lower-educated agreed in 2012 with the statement that their own financial
situation would deteriorate; when we move up the social ladder, this share gradually
declines to 40% among the higher educated and 30% among the higher social class
(Schmeets and Gielen 2015). The European sovereign debt crisis and austerity
measures in response to the economic downturn were the dominant themes in the
election debates preceding the installation of the minority cabinet headed by Prime
Minister Rutte in 2010. Finally, the minority cabinet Rutte collapsed when the
coalition partners failed to reach an agreement over the new austerity measures
resulting in new general elections in 2012. If there would be an effect of macro-
economic conditions on political participation, this would especially be observable
within the time frame studied here.
The effect of economic downturn on political participation may take several
directions. First, economic adversity might fuel political participation. During
economic hardship, governments are forced to resort to retrenchments that cause a
gap between what electorates expect and what governments are able to offer
(Thomassen 1990). Governments are blamed for economic duress and this blame
spurs political action. This argument is very close to the relative deprivation
argument presented above and can be traced back to Marx’ concept of
‘Verelendung’, who argued that in deteriorating economic conditions citizens will
resort to protest to voice their political concerns.
In the same vein, Davies’ (1962) J-curve hypothesis argued that economic
conditions mobilize political participation and might even overthrow regimes if a
period of economic prosperity is followed by a (short) period of sharp economic
decline. This sharp economic decline would lead to dissatisfaction that in turn
induces political action. The competing perspective argues that economic adversity
does not provide an incentive to participate but instead depresses political
participation. Citizens would be more preoccupied with their personal situation in
a sour economy and less able and willing to connect to the remote concerns of
politics (Rosenstone 1982). Another line of reasoning is linked with the civic
voluntarism model (Brady et al. 1995). Not only resources such as time, money and
civic skills foster political participation, but political participation is also largely
shaped by citizens’ involvement in non-political institutions such as work and
voluntary organizations. This could particularly be true for the Netherlands, a
country in which almost half of the population is volunteering in, e.g. sport clubs,
care institutions and churches. Economic decline would diminish the number of
volunteers and consequently reduce political participation. In addition, in line with
the resource mobilization theory (Wilson 1973), applied to the study of social
movements (Jenkins 1983), social classes respond to different kinds of incentives.
Purposive incentives work for middle- and upper-class groups, while lower-class
groups respond to selective incentives and collective solidarity (Wilson 1973). As,
in particular, the lower social classes perceive economic threat (Schmeets and
Gielen 2015), however, selective incentives and collective solidarity will simply not
work in the shadow of their positions being under threat. Thus, in times of economic
hardship, conventional and unconventional modes of political participation will
either increase (hypothesis 1) or decrease (hypothesis 2). Since economic hardship
is more prolonged and possibly more severe during the 2008-2012 period compared
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with that during the 2006–2010 period in the Netherlands, we assume that the
effects of economic hardship on political participation will be more pronounced
during the 2008–2012 period compared with the 2006–2010 period. At the
individual level, various studies have empirically demonstrated that political
participation, both conventional and unconventional modes, is more prevalent
among higher-educated and higher-class individuals (Dalton 2008; Desposato and
Norrander 2009; Norris et al. 2005). Higher social classes, those with higher
income, and the higher-educated people possess more skills needed for participation
(Brady et al. 1995). They have greater confidence that they understand politics and
that their efforts to participate in the political arena will bear fruit (Klandermans
et al. 2008; Lassen and Serritzlew 2011; Morrell 2003). Moreover, the higher
educated and those in higher social classes are also more likely to be involved
in civic associations that act as ‘schools of democracy’ (Van der Meer 2009).
These ‘civic skills’ might reinforce the associations between resources and
political participation. Hence, we expect that privileged groups in terms of
education and social class participate more in conventional and unconventional
modes (hypothesis 3).
Following the resource-based theory, we argue that lower-class and lower-
educated citizens have lower resources to participate in politics and therefore persist
to refrain from participating, whereas the more resourceful people are more likely to
voice their economic concerns in the political domain. Hence, we hypothesize that
the economic downturn would increase the gap in participation between privileged
and underprivileged groups in society since economic adversity is expected to
disproportionally affect the underprivileged, for which claim we provided the
evidence already derived from previous studies (Schmeets and Gielen 2015). These
underprivileged people do not have the resources to voice their concerns in the
political arena. We expect that the underprivileged, who lack resources to
participate to begin with, participate even less in times of economic downturn as
their disposable income will decrease and consequently this will have a detrimental
impact on their abilities in getting politically involved. We propose that such
increases in perceived financial deterioration would further decrease political
participation. Hence, our hypothesis reads: The initial differences between the
underprivileged and the more privileged categories of people will increase over time
during the economic crisis (hypothesis 4).
Control variables
We control for the following socio-demographic characteristics in our analyses:
income, country of origin, gender, and age. People of non-Dutch origin participate
less in modes of conventional and unconventional political participation (Schmeets
and Houwen 2010). Political participation also varies with age. Younger people are
more likely to participate in unconventional modes whereas older people are more
likely to participate in conventional modes of political participation (CBS 2014e):
therefore we include age as a control variable in our analyses. Men are more likely
to participate in various political actions that range from conventional modes such
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as contacting politicians to unconventional actions as attending demonstrations
(CBS 2014e).
Data and measurements
To test our hypotheses, we used the Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies (DPES
2006, 2010, 2012) conducted during each general election in the Netherlands. The
DPES’ aim is to collect high-quality data on the backgrounds of voting behaviour of
the Dutch electorate. The sampling frame of the DPES covers the Dutch electorate
eligible to vote in parliamentary elections (Dutch citizens aged 18 or older). In 2006
and 2010, respondents were interviewed in a pre-election survey within six weeks
before, and shortly after Election Day. We will only use the post-election waves of
the DPES (2006) and (2010) as these contained the items on political participation.
In 2012, only a post-election survey was carried out within a six-week time frame
after Election Day. The post-election waves for the DPES were primarily collected
by Computer Assisted Personal Interviewing (CAPI). Additionally, in 2006 and
2010 non-contacts and refusals were re-approached with a shortened questionnaire
by telephone or mail. This resulted in response rates of 64.3 and 57.0% in the post-
election wave (compared with the initial sample) in 2006 and 2010, respectively
(Schmeets 2011). In 2012, no refusal conversion techniques were applied, and all
respondents were interviewed using CAPI. This resulted in a response rate of
61.9%.
Dependent variables: conventional and unconventional political
participation
Our measure for unconventional political participation refers to participation in
political discussions on the internet, participating in action groups and participation
in demonstrations or protest meetings. We used involving political parties or
organizations, attending hearings, and contacting politicians or civil servants as
indicators of conventional political participation. See Table 1 for the exact question
wording in the DPES, expressing that it concerns political activities employed
within the previous five years before the date of the interview.
Scale construction: conventional and unconventional political participation
We constructed separate scales for conventional and unconventional political
participation that represent the average score on the relevant dichotomous
indicators.2 We assessed the scalability of these items using probabilistic scale
analysis techniques (Mokken 1971; van Schuur 2003). Mokken-scale analysis is the
probabilistic version of the deterministic Guttmann scale. Mokken-scale analysis
2 We omitted voting out of our analyses since this is a different kind of political activity compared with
the conventional and unconventional activities studied here. People vote once every few years while most
of the conventional and unconventional political activities studied here, such as attending a demonstration
or writing to government officials, requires more prolonged time commitments.
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uses a set of dichotomous indicators, for instance, involving a political party yes or
no, and evaluates whether certain items, such as political discussion on the internet,
may be easier and thereby more popular activities compared with others, such as
attending a demonstration. The decisive notion is that those who engage in more
difficult, i.e. less popular, activities will probably (not necessarily) also engage in
easier or more popular activities.3 This means that the probability of a positive
response to an item increases in concordance with the value of a subject’s latent
trait. Hence, we test whether individuals that engage in a more difficult or less
popular activity also engage in a less difficult political activity. Applied to
unconventional modes of political participation, this means we test whether those
that engage in a more difficult activity such as attending a demonstration also
engage in easier unconventional political activities such as engaging in a political
discussion on the internet.
The cumulative nature of the response on the items for political participation also
has important theoretical implications that are neglected when analysing these items
separately. It is theoretically (implicitly or explicitly) assumed that people specialize
within either conventional or unconventional modes of participation and that
participation is cumulative (c.f. Millbrath 1965; Verba et al. 1978; Zukin 2006).
Mokken scaling incorporates the respective ‘difficulty’ of certain acts of political
participation vis-a`-vis other, easier or more mainstream acts of political participa-
tion. By assessing the respective difficulty of acts of political participation using
Mokken scaling, we acknowledge this cumulative nature of participation.
Table 1 Question wording political participation Dutch Parliamentary Election Studies 2006–2012
Item Answer
categories
There are several ways to influence politicians, civil servants or
the government. Please list which one you used during the
previous five years.
Unconventional
political participation
Participated in a political discussion on the internet, via sms or
e-mail.
Yes/no
Participated in an action group. Yes/no
Participated in a demonstration or protest meeting. Yes/no
Conventional political
participation
Contacted a politician or government official. Yes/no
Participate in a hearing or consultation meeting organized by the
government.
Yes/no
Tried to involve political party or organization. Yes/no
3 Mokken-scale analysis has numerous advantages over more mainstream scaling methods, such as factor
analyses and measurement models specified in structural equation modelling. These methods are based on
the decomposition of covariances and assume that frequency distributions of the items can be regarded as
‘parallel’ and the items have more or less the same mean and standard deviation. Thus, all items need to
be equally ‘popular’ to be adequately used for scaling (van Schuur 2003). Distribution of the items for
political participation clearly demonstrates that this is not the case, e.g. the proportion of people who
engage in political discussion on the internet, is considerably larger compared with the proportion of
people who attended a demonstration.
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In terms of comparability of measurements, or equivalence, we analyse the extent
to which the ordering in terms of difficulty of the items is similar over time. If the
ordering in modes of political participation is similar over time, measurements are
considered equivalent and scale-scores can be compared.
The results of the Mokken-scale analysis are presented in Table 2. For each act
of political participation the proportion of people that engaged in these acts the
past five years is shown for conventional and unconventional modes. In the
context of Mokken-scale analyses, these proportions represent the ‘item difficul-
ties’. We find that for unconventional modes of political participation the item
ordering pattern from most popular to least popular activity is political discussion
on the internet, participation in an action group, and demonstrating, respectively.
For conventional modes of political participation, Table 2 shows that contacting a
politician or government official is the most popular activity, followed by
attending a hearing. Involving a political party is the least popular conventional
political activity.
Table 2 also shows that the item ordering pattern is similar across time and thus
longitudinally equivalent. This is represented in the Loevinger’s H coefficients.
These represent the scalability of the Mokken scale based on the number of
violations of the item-ordering pattern. A violation of the item ordering pattern
would occur if respondents do engage in more difficult acts (for instance
demonstrating), but do not engage in easier more popular acts (for instance joining
a political discussion on the internet). The Loevinger’s H coefficients are above the
cut-off value of 0.3 (Sijtsma and Molenaar 2002). Based on the results of these
Mokken-scale analyses, we construct a scale that consists of the average score on
the items pertaining to conventional and unconventional political participation that
ranges between 0 and 100 so that our coefficients in the analyses represent the
percentage of active citizens.
Resources
We operationalized resources in two different ways. First, we used education as a
proxy for someone’s civic skills and resources. Education is measured in five
categories: elementary education, lower vocational education, secondary education,
middle-level vocational education or higher-level secondary education, and, finally
higher-level vocational education or university. We include education as a
continuous variable in our analyses.4 Second, we used social class as a proxy for
resources and relative deprivation. Respondents were asked which social class they
perceived themselves to be a member of: ‘‘One sometimes speaks of the existence of
4 We compared a model using education as a continuous variable to a model including dummy variables
for each category of education. Model 2 including dummy variables results in a slightly better model fit
compared with a model including education as a continuous variable for both dependent variables (R2
change = 0.012 with p = 0.000 for unconventional political participation and R2 change = 0.011 with
p = 0.000 for conventional political participation). However, the results including dummy variables for
education, which are presented in the appendix, do not qualitatively differ from the results presented in
Tables 4 and 5. For reasons of brevity and to gain statistical power, we present the parsimonious models
including education as a continuous measurement.
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various social classes and groups. If you were to assign yourself to a particular
social class, which one would that be?’’ The categories range from upper class,
upper middle class, middle class, upper working class, to working class. Social class
is included as having a linear relationship with the dependent variables in our
analyses. .5
The DPES data were enriched with registry-based information on income drawn
from the Dutch tax office. We used the standardized disposable annual income. The
disposable income is composed of wages, profits (for self-employed persons) and
other allowances minus social contributions and taxes, standardized for household
size and composition. To arrive at a longitudinally comparative measure of income,
the standardized household income was classified in vigintiles according to the
Dutch population. For reference, the lowest vigintile in 2006 represents spendable
incomes lower than € 9530 per year, whereas the highest category represents
spendable incomes of € 41,243 and higher. To take into account possible nonlinear
associations between income and political participation, we included a quadratic
term for income.
Control variables
We controlled for age, gender, and country of origin. Age was defined as age at
Election Day. In the Netherlands, the age threshold for participating in elections
is 18 years. To control for possible nonlinear effects of age, we included a
quadratic term for age as well. For origin we distinguished between Dutch origin
and non-Dutch origin. Respondents who were born in the Netherlands and have
parents that were born in the Netherlands were classified as Dutch origin. Those
who were born outside the Netherlands themselves or their parents were classified
as non-Dutch. The descriptive statistics for all relevant variables are presented in
Table 3.
Analyses
The results for conventional political participation are displayed in Table 4. In
Table 5, we present the results of the analyses for unconventional modes of
participation. We use the same estimation strategy for both modes of participation.
In the first model, we include dummy variables for the years 2010 and 2012 to
assess whether there is significant longitudinal variation compared with 2006 in
political participation in the Netherlands in times of economic crises. Model 2
includes the main independent variables that refer to resources (education and social
5 We assessed whether social class can be modelled as a pseudo-interval variable by testing to what
extent the association between social class and conventional and unconventional political participation
can be modelled with linear terms only. We ran model 2 including social class as a set of dummy
variables and compared these to models using social class as a linear effect. No difference was found in fit
between the two models (R2 change = 0.000 with p = 0.943 and R2 change = 0.001 with p = 0.115 for
unconventional and conventional political participation, respectively).
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class) and the control variables. In model 3 and model 4, we assess whether the
effects of social class and education on political participation systematically diverge
in times of economic crises by including interaction terms. We ran OLS-regression
analysis with the Mokken scales for conventional and unconventional political
participation presented above as dependent variables.6,7,8
Table 3 Descriptive statistics
Min Max Mean SD
Conventional political participation 0.00 100.00 9.32 21.54
Unconventional political participation 0.00 100.00 10.51 19.37
Income 1.00 20.00 10.92 5.67
Age 18.00 96.00 47.55 17.56
% n
Highest education completed 6.6 249
Elementary 16.6 727
Lower vocational 8.3 347
Secondary 41.8 1875
Middle-level vocational/Higher-level secondary 26.7 1401
Higher-level vocational/university
Social class
Working class 18.7 740
Upper working class 12.9 578
Middle class 49.1 2302
Upper middle class 17.2 874
Upper class 2.1 105
Gender
Male 50.9 2307
Female 49.1 2292
Origin
Dutch origin 85.4 4127
Non-Dutch 14.6 472
Total 4599
6 Given the ordinal and very skewed nature (most people do not participate politically), one might argue
that ordered logit regression analyses is more appropriate. We compared the estimates presented here with
the estimates from ordered logit models; the results did not substantially differ from OLS results, which
are presented in this paper for ease of interpretation.
7 These analyses presented here were performed on the unweighted sample. Analysis with the sample
weighted according to age, gender, marital status, urbanization, region, origin, turnout (i.e.. voted in most
recent parliamentary elections yes/no), and voting behaviour did not differ from the results presented here
for both conventional and unconventional political participation.
8 There is no substantial difference between the models including all missing values on each variable as
separate categories and the estimates presented in Tables 4 and 5.
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Results
Let us first look at conventional political participation in Table 4. In model 1, we
find that there is no significant difference in levels of political participation during
the periods of 2002–2006 and 2006–2010 whereas a significant (albeit small)
decline is observed during the 2008–2012 period compared with 2002–2006 period
(and also in comparison with 2006–2010 period). This suggests that levels of
conventional political participation are slightly in decline in times of prolonged
economic hardship. Moreover, this effect also holds after including all control
variables in model 2. Model 1 in Table 5 demonstrates that unconventional political
participation remains stable between 2002–2006 and 2006–2010 but is slightly and
Table 5 Linear regression analysis: unconventional political participation (n = 4, 559)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
b SE b SE b SE b SE
2006 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.
2010 -0.208 (0.687) -0.497 (0.667) 2.000 (2.201) 2.214 (2.416)
2012 1.430* (0.698) 1.355* (0.681) 1.090 (2.214) 2.357 (2.445)
2012a 1.638* (0.720) 1.852** (0.704) -0.910 (2.331) 0.142 (2.577)
Level of
education
2.528** (0.278) 2.712** (0.411) 2.579** (0.440)
Social class 1.201** (0.325) 1.212** (0.325) 1.545** (0.514)
Level of
education
2010 -0.663 (0.560) -0.592 (0.633)
2012 0.065 (0.563) 0.404 (0.630)
2012a 0.728 (0.586) 0.997 (0.655)
Social class
2010 -0.174 (0.748)
2012 -0.918 (0.757)
2012a -0.744 (0.789)
Income -0.247 (0.213) -0.224 (0.214) -0.231 (0.214)
Income2 0.008 (0.010) 0.007 (0.010) 0.007 (0.010)
Female Ref. Ref. Ref.
Male 0.235 (0.557) 0.256 (0.557) 0.254 (0.557)
Dutch origin Ref. Ref. Ref.
Non-Dutch
origin
-0.143 (0.918) -0.103 (0.919) -0.105 (0.919)
Age 0.115 (0.091) 0.121 (0.092) 0.121 (0.092)
Age2 -0.002** (0.001) -0.002** (0.001) -0.003** (0.001)
Intercept 10.141** (0.469) -0.255 (2.590) -1.186 (2.847) -1.606 (2.886)
R2 0.001 0.062 0.063 0.063
* p\ 0.05; ** p\ 0.01 (two tailed)
a Tests for significance with the reference category being 2010
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significantly on the rise when the economy turns sour during the 2008–2012 period.
This also holds when controlling for relevant characteristics in model 2. These
results do not firmly support the first hypothesis as only the unconventional
activities increased, but not the conventional activities. Likewise, we do not find a
confirmation for the second hypothesis as there is only a small decline for the
conventional modes found.
Furthermore, our results demonstrate that with higher levels of education,
conventional as well as unconventional political participation increases. Also, those
who consider themselves belonging to higher social classes consistently participate
more in both modes. This confirms the third hypothesis. The interaction terms in
model 3 and model 4 demonstrate that the economic crisis does not influence the
strength of the effect of education on conventional political participation. Hence,
levels of conventional and unconventional political participation do not diverge
between privileged and underprivileged groups in times of economic crisis. These
findings clearly reject the fourth hypothesis.
Concerning our control variables we find that income affects conventional political
participation in curvilinear fashion. The lowest levels of conventional political
participation are found in the 8th and 9th vigintile and increases from the 10th vigintile
onwards. However, income is not significantly related to unconventional modes of
participation. Moreover we demonstrate that men are more likely to participate in
conventional modes but there is no gender difference in their level of unconventional
political participation (c.f. Tables 4 and 5). Origin is not related to both conventional
and unconventional modes of participation. The calculation based on the age and
age 9 age variables reveals that the conventional political participation increases to
the top found among people aged 59 after which it decreases. For unconventional
political participation the top is 30 year, and evidently lower.
Conclusion and discussion
In this contribution, we attempted to explore the effects of the economic crisis on
levels of political participation in the Netherlands between 2002 and 2012, in general
and more particularly among privileged and underprivileged groups in society. We
used the classic distinction between conventional and unconventional modes of
political participation as proposed by Barnes and Kaase (1979). Against the
background of the recent economic crises, we argued that economic downturn would
either incentivize citizens to voice their concerns in the political domain (Thomassen
1990; Mun˜oz et al. 2013; Ponticelli and Voth 2011) or that economic downturn would
induce political apathy (Rosenstone 1982). We combined this with the expectations
following from the civic voluntarism model and the resource mobilization theory
proposed that during times of economic crisis privileged and underprivileged groups
in society systematically diverge in their levels of participation.
Using probabilistic scale modelling techniques, we demonstrated that both
conventional and unconventional political participation are cumulative behavioural
patterns. Hence, people who engage in more difficult political acts, such as
demonstrating, also engage in easier or more mainstream acts of political
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participation such as joining political discussion on the internet. Moreover, we
demonstrated that the pattern in modes of both conventional and unconventional
political activities does not change substantially over time.
Our results indicate, first and foremost that most people do not engage in any
conventional and unconventional mode of political participation studied here. Only
some one in three citizens employed an activity in trying to influence politicians,
civil servants or the government within a five years period. However, we find that in
recent times of economic downturn in the Netherlands, conventional political
participation decreases while unconventional political participation is on the rise.
We demonstrate that those with more skills and resources (higher educated) and
people in higher social classes participate more in both conventional and
unconventional modes of participation which is consistent with the resource-based
explanation of political participation as proposed by Brady et al. (1995). We
hypothesized that underprivileged groups would be disproportionally affected by
the economic crisis compared with privileged groups, thereby increasing the gap
between these strata in society. We distinguished between higher- and lower social
classes and higher- and lower-educated individuals. However, we do not find that
the difference between privileged and underprivileged societal groups is affected by
the economic downturn.
One might argue that an increase in unconventional political participation
combined with a decrease in conventional modes would be emblematic of a more
structural trend of switching political repertoires (Dalton 2008; Norris 2011) from
conventional to unconventional modes. Citizens would increasingly voice their
concerns through unconventional modes of political participation at the expense of
conventional modes (Dalton 2008). However, the decrease in conventional political
participation and the increase in unconventional modes only occur in the 2008-2012
period—in a time when the Netherlands suffered from economic adversity. We
speculate that this increase in unconventional modes is due to the difference in
required skills for conventional and unconventional political participation. It takes
more civic skills to involve a political party compared to joining in a political
discussion on the internet, and during times of economic downturn, citizens might
increasingly voice their concerns through more accessible means of political
participation. The underlying mechanisms governing this effect need to be taken
into account in more detail in further research to assess the validity of this
assumption.
Appendix
See Tables 6 and 7.
298 R. Linssen et al.
T
a
b
le
6
L
in
ea
r
re
g
re
ss
io
n
an
al
y
si
s:
co
n
v
en
ti
o
n
al
p
o
li
ti
ca
l
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
u
si
n
g
d
u
m
m
y
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
fo
r
le
v
el
o
f
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
(n
=
4
,
5
9
9
)
M
o
d
el
1
M
o
d
el
2
M
o
d
el
3
M
o
d
el
4
b
S
E
b
S
E
b
S
E
b
S
E
2
0
0
6
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
2
0
1
0
0
.5
2
7
(0
.7
6
3
)
0
.0
4
1
(0
.7
3
5
)
1
.2
9
3
(3
.2
2
1
)
0
.9
6
8
(3
.5
7
0
)
2
0
1
2
-
2
.1
3
4
*
*
(0
.7
7
6
)
-
2
.3
7
4
*
*
(0
.7
5
0
)
0
.5
6
8
(3
.1
5
5
)
3
.3
1
4
(3
.5
3
4
)
2
0
1
2
a
-
2
.6
6
2
*
*
(0
.8
0
1
)
-
2
.4
1
5
*
*
(0
.7
7
5
)
-
0
.7
2
5
(3
.3
1
5
)
2
.3
4
6
(3
.7
2
3
)
E
le
m
en
ta
ry
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
L
o
w
er
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
al
1
.0
7
5
(1
.5
6
5
)
2
.9
5
1
(2
.5
1
2
)
2
.8
2
2
(2
.5
1
5
)
S
ec
o
n
d
ar
y
2
.3
7
4
(1
.7
8
)
2
.4
2
4
(2
.8
0
5
)
2
.0
4
6
(2
.8
3
6
)
M
id
d
le
-l
ev
el
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
/h
ig
h
er
-l
ev
el
se
co
n
d
ar
y
3
.0
6
6
*
(1
.5
1
)
5
.0
0
5
*
(2
.3
8
5
)
4
.6
4
6
*
(2
.4
1
9
)
H
ig
h
er
-l
ev
el
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
al
/u
n
iv
er
si
ty
1
0
.7
9
7
*
*
(1
.6
2
)
1
1
.7
6
2
*
*
(2
.5
0
0
)
1
1
.1
1
3
*
*
(2
.6
0
4
)
S
o
ci
al
cl
as
s
1
.5
5
5
*
*
(0
.3
6
)
1
.5
4
7
*
*
(0
.3
6
3
)
1
.9
3
7
*
*
(0
.5
7
4
)
L
o
w
er
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
al
2
0
1
0
-
2
.2
5
9
(3
.7
0
4
)
-
2
.2
7
5
(3
.7
1
2
)
2
0
1
2
-
3
.5
7
4
(3
.6
6
6
)
-
3
.2
1
6
(3
.6
7
2
)
2
0
1
2
a
-
1
.3
1
5
(3
.8
5
7
)
-
0
.9
4
1
(3
.8
6
3
)
S
ec
o
n
d
ar
y
2
0
1
0
0
.7
9
6
(4
.1
4
1
)
0
.7
2
1
(4
.2
0
8
)
2
0
1
2
-
0
.2
8
9
(4
.2
0
1
)
0
.7
3
6
(4
.2
5
1
)
2
0
1
2
a
-
1
.0
8
4
(4
.4
2
9
)
0
.0
1
5
(4
.4
7
5
)
M
id
d
le
-l
ev
el
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
/h
ig
h
er
-l
ev
el
se
co
n
d
ar
y
2
0
1
0
-
2
.6
0
0
(3
.4
1
9
)
-
2
.7
0
5
(3
.4
9
8
)
2
0
1
2
-
3
.2
8
7
(3
.3
6
1
)
-
2
.1
8
6
(3
.4
2
8
)
2
0
1
2
a
2
.6
0
0
(3
.4
1
9
)
2
.7
0
5
(3
.4
9
8
)
Conventional and unconventional political participation… 299
T
a
b
le
6
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
M
o
d
el
1
M
o
d
el
2
M
o
d
el
3
M
o
d
el
4
b
S
E
b
S
E
b
S
E
b
S
E
H
ig
h
er
-l
ev
el
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
al
/u
n
iv
er
si
ty
2
0
1
0
0
.2
8
3
(3
.4
9
1
)
0
.0
9
5
(3
.7
3
8
)
2
0
1
2
-
3
.2
3
7
(3
.4
3
8
)
-
1
.1
2
8
(3
.6
6
7
)
2
0
1
2
a
-
3
.5
2
1
(3
.5
8
6
)
-
1
.2
2
3
(3
.8
1
4
)
S
o
ci
al
cl
as
s
2
0
1
0
0
.1
4
8
(0
.8
3
6
)
2
0
1
2
-
1
.4
3
7
(0
.8
4
6
)
2
0
1
2
a
-
1
.5
8
6
(0
.8
8
1
)
In
co
m
e
-
0
.3
2
7
(0
.2
3
)
-
0
.3
5
4
(0
.2
3
6
)
0
.3
6
4
(0
.2
3
6
)
In
co
m
e2
0
.0
1
9
*
(0
.0
1
)
0
.0
2
1
*
(0
.0
1
1
)
0
.0
2
1
*
(0
.0
1
1
)
F
em
al
e
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
M
al
e
3
.6
9
1
*
*
(0
.6
1
)
3
.6
2
5
*
*
(0
.6
1
7
)
3
.6
1
7
*
*
(0
.6
1
7
)
D
u
tc
h
o
ri
g
in
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
N
o
n
D
u
tc
h
o
ri
g
in
-
0
.1
0
7
(1
.0
1
3
)
-
0
.1
5
6
(1
.0
1
4
)
-
0
.1
6
1
(1
.0
1
4
)
A
g
e
0
.6
6
5
*
*
(0
.1
0
1
)
0
.6
6
5
*
*
(0
.1
0
2
)
0
.6
6
7
*
*
(0
.1
0
2
)
A
g
e2
-
0
.0
0
6
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
-
0
.0
0
6
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
-
0
.0
0
6
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
In
te
rc
ep
t
9
.8
0
9
*
*
(0
.5
2
1
)
-
1
7
.4
7
2
*
*
(3
.0
0
0
)
-
1
8
.7
4
2
*
*
(3
.4
4
9
)
-
1
9
.4
4
2
*
*
(3
.5
3
0
)
R
2
0
.0
0
3
0
.0
8
2
0
.0
8
3
0
.0
8
4
*
p
\
0
.0
5
;
*
*
p
\
0
.0
1
(t
w
o
ta
il
ed
)
a
T
es
ts
fo
r
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
if
th
e
re
fe
re
n
ce
ca
te
g
o
ry
is
ch
an
g
ed
to
2
0
1
0
300 R. Linssen et al.
T
a
b
le
7
L
in
ea
r
re
g
re
ss
io
n
an
al
y
si
s:
u
n
co
n
v
en
ti
o
n
al
p
o
li
ti
ca
l
p
ar
ti
ci
p
at
io
n
u
si
n
g
d
u
m
m
y
v
ar
ia
b
le
s
fo
r
le
v
el
o
f
ed
u
ca
ti
o
n
(n
=
4
,
5
9
9
)
M
o
d
el
1
M
o
d
el
2
M
o
d
el
3
M
o
d
el
4
b
s.
e
b
s.
e
b
s.
e
b
s.
e
In
te
rc
ep
t
1
0
.1
4
1
*
*
(0
.4
6
9
)
7
.1
4
7
*
*
(2
.7
1
2
)
6
.3
9
9
*
(3
.1
1
7
)
5
.6
7
7
*
(3
.1
9
2
)
2
0
0
6
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
2
0
1
0
-
0
.2
0
8
(0
.6
8
7
)
-
0
.5
8
1
(0
.6
6
4
)
1
.2
1
0
(2
.9
1
1
)
1
.7
4
6
(3
.2
2
8
)
2
0
1
2
1
.4
3
0
*
(0
.6
9
8
)
1
.2
0
9
*
(0
.6
7
8
)
1
.0
5
3
(2
.8
5
1
)
3
.0
2
3
(3
.1
9
5
)
2
0
1
2
a
1
.6
3
8
*
(0
.7
2
0
)
1
.7
9
0
*
*
(0
.7
0
1
)
-
0
.1
5
7
(2
.9
9
6
)
1
.2
7
7
(3
.3
6
6
)
In
co
m
e
-
0
.1
6
0
(0
.2
1
3
)
-
0
.1
4
0
(0
.2
1
4
)
-
0
.1
4
6
(0
.2
1
4
)
In
co
m
e2
0
.0
0
4
(0
.0
1
0
)
0
.0
0
3
(0
.0
1
0
)
0
.0
0
3
(0
.0
1
0
)
F
em
al
e
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
M
al
e
0
.1
5
4
(0
.5
5
7
)
0
.1
7
2
(0
.5
5
8
)
0
.1
7
1
(0
.5
5
8
)
D
u
tc
h
o
ri
g
in
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
R
ef
.
N
o
n
D
u
tc
h
o
ri
g
in
-
0
.1
7
3
(0
.9
1
6
)
-
0
.0
8
9
(0
.9
1
7
)
-
0
.0
8
7
(0
.9
1
7
)
A
g
e
0
.1
0
2
(0
.0
9
2
)
0
.1
1
0
(0
.0
9
2
)
0
.1
1
1
(0
.0
9
2
)
A
g
e2
-
0
.0
0
2
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
-
0
.0
0
3
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
-
0
.0
0
3
*
*
(0
.0
0
1
)
E
le
m
en
ta
ry
L
o
w
er
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
al
-
0
.6
5
3
(1
.4
1
5
)
0
.0
8
2
(2
.2
7
1
)
-
0
.0
5
0
(2
.2
7
4
)
S
ec
o
n
d
ar
y
0
.5
1
0
(1
.6
1
4
)
-
1
.5
3
5
(2
.5
3
5
)
-
1
.9
3
4
(2
.5
6
4
)
M
id
d
le
-l
ev
el
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
/h
ig
h
er
-l
ev
el
se
co
n
d
ar
y
2
.1
6
5
(1
.3
7
4
)
2
.7
1
1
(2
.1
5
6
)
2
.3
3
3
(2
.1
8
7
)
H
ig
h
er
-l
ev
el
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
al
/u
n
iv
er
si
ty
8
.7
7
4
*
*
(1
.4
6
8
)
9
.7
3
8
*
*
(2
.2
5
9
)
9
.0
5
4
*
*
(2
.3
5
4
)
S
o
ci
al
cl
as
s
0
.9
2
8
*
*
(0
.3
2
7
)
0
.9
4
9
*
*
(0
.3
2
8
)
1
.3
6
3
*
*
(0
.5
1
9
)
L
o
w
er
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
al
2
0
1
0
-
1
.5
8
1
(3
.3
4
8
)
-
1
.4
7
5
(3
.3
5
6
)
2
0
1
2
-
1
.0
2
5
(3
.3
1
3
)
-
0
.7
5
4
(3
.3
2
0
)
2
0
1
2
a
0
.5
5
6
(3
.4
8
7
)
0
.7
2
1
(3
.4
9
2
)
Conventional and unconventional political participation… 301
T
a
b
le
7
co
n
ti
n
u
ed
M
o
d
el
1
M
o
d
el
2
M
o
d
el
3
M
o
d
el
4
b
s.
e
b
s.
e
b
s.
e
b
s.
e
S
ec
o
n
d
ar
y
2
0
1
0
3
.4
7
5
(3
.7
4
3
)
3
.7
8
6
(3
.8
0
5
)
2
0
1
2
3
.3
7
2
(3
.7
9
7
)
4
.1
5
9
(3
.8
4
3
)
2
0
1
2
a
-
0
.1
0
2
(4
.0
0
3
)
0
.3
7
2
(4
.0
4
6
)
M
id
d
le
-l
ev
el
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
/h
ig
h
er
-l
ev
el
se
co
n
d
ar
y
2
0
1
0
-
2
.2
0
7
(3
.0
9
0
)
-
1
.9
1
8
(3
.1
6
3
)
2
0
1
2
0
.2
3
2
(3
.0
3
8
)
1
.0
5
5
(3
.0
9
9
)
2
0
1
2
a
2
.4
3
9
(3
.1
8
5
)
2
.9
7
3
(3
.2
4
6
)
H
ig
h
er
-l
ev
el
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
al
/u
n
iv
er
si
ty
2
0
1
0
-
3
.0
0
9
(3
.1
5
6
)
-
2
.4
8
8
(3
.3
7
9
)
2
0
1
2
-
0
.2
2
2
(3
.1
0
7
)
1
.3
3
9
(3
.3
1
6
)
2
0
1
2
a
2
.7
8
7
(3
.2
4
1
)
3
.8
2
7
(3
.4
4
8
)
S
o
ci
al
cl
as
s
2
0
1
0
-
0
.3
0
7
(0
.7
5
6
)
2
0
1
2
-
1
.0
4
2
(0
.7
6
5
)
2
0
1
2
a
-
0
.7
3
4
(0
.7
9
6
)
R
2
0
.0
0
1
0
.0
7
2
0
.0
7
3
0
.0
7
4
*
p
\
0
.0
5
;
*
*
p
\
0
.0
1
(t
w
o
ta
il
ed
)
a
T
es
ts
fo
r
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
if
th
e
re
fe
re
n
ce
ca
te
g
o
ry
is
ch
an
g
ed
to
2
0
1
0
302 R. Linssen et al.
References
Aarts, K., H. van der Kolk, and M. Rosema. 2007. Een verdeeld electoraat? Houten: Spectrum.
Anderson, C.J. 2007. The end of economic voting? Contingency dilemmas and the limits of democratic
accountability. Annual Review of Political Science 10: 271–296.
Barnes, S.H., and M. Kaase. 1979. Political action: Mass participation in five western democracies.
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Brady, H.E., S. Verba, and K.L. Schlozman. 1995. Beyond ses: A resource model of political
participation. American Political Science Review 89 (2): 271–294.
CBS. 2013. Sustained economic contraction. Statistics Netherlands press release, PB13-011, 14 February
2013. The Hague/Heerlen: Statistics Netherlands.
CBS. 2014a. Labour force; main figures by sex and other personal characteristics. CBS Statline. Retrieved
2 April, 2014 from: http://statline.cbs.nl/.
CBS. 2014b. Financieel risico hypotheekschuld; eigenwoningbezitters (Financial risk mortgage debt;
homeowners). CBS Statline. http://statline.cbs.nl/. Accessed 2 April 2014.
CBS. 2014c. Government finance statistics; key figures. CBS Statline. http://statline.cbs.nl/. Accessed 2
April 2014.
CBS. 2014d. Nationale problemen volgens stemgerechtigden (National problems according to the
electorate). CBS Statline. http://statline.cbs.nl/. Accessed 3 April 2014.
CBS. 2014e. Sociale contacten en maatschappelijke participatie (Social contact and societal participa-
tion). http://statline.cbs.nl/. Accessed 6 May 2014.
Dalton, R.J. 2008. Citizenship norms and the expansion of political participation. Political Studies 56 (1):
76–98.
Davies, J.C. 1962. Toward a theory of revolution. American Sociological Review 27 (1): 5–19.
Desposato, S., and B. Norrander. 2009. The gender gap in latin america: contextual and individual
influences on gender and political participation. British Journal of Political Science 39 (1): 141–162.
DPES. 2006. Dutch parliamentary election surveys 2006. Amsterdam: DANS KNAW.
DPES. 2010. Dutch parliamentary election studies 2010. Amsterdam: DANS KNAW.
DPES. 2012. Dutch parliamentary election studies 2012. Amsterdam: DANS/KNAW.
Gesthuizen, M., P. Scheepers, W. Van Der Veld, and B. Vo¨lker. 2013. Structural aspects of social capital:
Tests for cross-national equivalence in europe. Quality & Quantity 47 (2): 909–922.
Hackert, M., R. Linssen, and H. Schmeets. 2012. Economische en culturele dreiging: Wie ervaart dreiging
en wie niet? [Economic and cultural threat: Who feels threatened and who doesn’t?]. Sociaal-
economische trends 2012 (4): 45–52.
Jenkins, J.C. 1983. Resource mobilization theory and the study of social movements. Annual Review of
Sociology 9 (1983): 527–553.
Klandermans, B., J. Van der Toorn, and J. Van Stekelenburg. 2008. Embeddedness and identity: How
immigrants turn grievances into action. American Sociological Review 73 (6): 992–1012.
Lamprianou, I. 2013. Contemporary political participation research: A critical assessment. In Democracy
in transition, ed. K. Demetriou, 21–42. Berlin: Springer.
Lassen, D.D., and S. Serritzlew. 2011. Jurisdiction size and local democracy: Evidence on internal
political efficacy from large-scale municipal reform. American Political Science Review 105 (2):
238–258.
Lewis-Beck, M.S., and M. Stegmaier. 2000. Economic determinants of electoral outcomes. Annual
Review of Political Science 3 (1): 183–219.
Linssen, R., and H. Schmeets. 2010. Participatie en vertrouwen in europa (Participation and trust in
europe). In Sociale samenhang: Participatie, vertrouwen en integratie (Social cohesion: Partic-
ipation, trust, and integration), ed. H. Schmeets, 135–151. The Hague/Heerlen: Statistics
Netherlands.
Millbrath, L. 1965. Political participation: How and why do people get involved in politics?. Chicago:
Rand McNally.
Mokken, R.J. 1971. A theory and procedure of scale analysis with applications in political research. The
Hague: Mouton & Co.
Morrell, M.E. 2003. Survey and experimental evidence for a reliable and valid measure of internal
political efficacy. Public Opinion Quarterly 67 (4): 589–602.
Mun˜oz, J., G. Rico and E. Anduiza. 2013. Austerity policies and political involvement. Evidence from a
panel survey in spain (2010-11) Working paper Universitat Autonoma de Barcelona.
Conventional and unconventional political participation… 303
Norris, P. 2011. Democratic deficit: Critical citizens revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Norris, P., S. Walgrave, and P. Van Aelst. 2005. Who demonstrates? Antistate rebels, conventional
participants or everyone? Comparative Politics 37 (2): 189–205.
Ponticelli, J. and H.A. Voth. 2011. Austerity and anarchy: Budget cuts and social unrest in europe,
1919-2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1899287. Accessed 26 July 2013.
Radcliff, B. 1992. The welfare state, turnout, and the economy: A comparative analysis. American
Political Science Review 86 (2): 444–454.
Rosenstone, S.J. 1982. Economic adversity and voter turnout. American Journal of Political Science 26:
26–46.
Schmeets, H. 2011. Verkiezingen: Participatie, vertrouwen en integratie (Elections: Participation, trust,
and integration). The Hague/Heerlen: Statistics Netherlands.
Schmeets, H. and W. Gielen. 2015. Econische en Culturele dreiging in Nederland (Econonomic and
cultural threat in the Netherlands) In Nationaal Kiezersonderzoek 2006-2012 (Dutch Parliamentary
Election Sudy 2006-2012) ed. Schmeets, H, 62-76. The Hague/Heerlen: Statistics Netherlands.
Schmeets, H. and K. Van der Houwen. 2010. Politieke betrokkenheid van allochtonen (Political
engagement of minorities), ed Schmeets, H, 186-196. The Hague/Heerlen: Statistics Netherlands.
Sijtsma, K., and W. Molenaar. 2002. Introduction to nonparametric item response theory. Thousand
Oaks: Sage.
Thomassen, J.J. 1990. Economic crisis, dissatisfaction, and protest. In Continuities in political action: A
longitudinal study of political orientations in three western democracies, eds. M.K. Jennings, J.W.
Van Deth, S.H. Barnes, D. Fuchs, F.J. Heunks, R.F. Inglehart, and J.J. Thomassen, 103–134. Berlin:
Walter de Gruyter.
Van der Meer, T. 2009. States of freely associating citizens: Comparative studies into the impact of state
institutions on social, civic and political participation. Nijmegen: Radboud Universiteit Nijmegen
ICS dissertation.
Van Schuur, W. 2003. Mokken scale analysis: Between the guttman scale and parametric item-response
theory. Political Analysis 11 (2): 139–163.
Verba, S., N. Nie, and J. Kim. 1978. Participation and political equality: A seven-nation comparison.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Wilson, J. 1973. Introduction to social movements. New York: Praeger.
Zukin, C. 2006. A new engagement: Political participation, civic life, and the changing american citizen.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
304 R. Linssen et al.
